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INTRODUCTION
Widespread concerns about the long-term fiscal gap in Social Se-
curity have prompted various proposals for structural reform, with in-
dividual accounts as the centerpiece. In particular, the proposals
issued by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security in
its 2001 final report would carve out a substantial portion of the ex-
isting defined benefit structure and replace it with voluntary individ-
ual accounts, resulting in a novel hybrid system.' The proposal to
introduce individual accounts into the public system, while not fully
specified, reflects a parallel shift from traditional defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans which has already unfolded in the
private system of employer-provided pensions. In both public and pri-
vate contexts, the debate over the structure of retirement savings pro-
grams exposes a deeper struggle over the goals of national retirement
policy and the appropriate allocation of risks and responsibilities
among government, employers, and workers.
t Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
tt Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. The authors acknowledge gener-
ous research support from the University of San Diego School of Law.
I See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SoC. SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECUR-




PRIVATE PENSIONS IN TRANSITION
The rapid expansion of employer-based pension plans during
and after World War II was fueled not only by preferential tax treat-
ment and wage pressures but also by the exceptionally generous bene-
fits that the Social Security system conferred on early cohorts of
workers. Social Security benefits were tilted in favor of low-income
workers due to a progressive benefit formula which produced a de-
clining ratio of benefits to pre-retirement income for higher-income
workers. Private pension plans were also subject to nondiscrimination
rules, which limited the employer's ability to skew plan benefits in
favor of highly compensated employees. In testing for nondiscrimina-
tion, however, employers were allowed to claim full credit for Social
Security benefits by "integrating" them with employer-provided pen-
sion benefits. As a result, while Social Security benefits were weighted
in favor of low-income workers, private plans channeled benefits to
high-income workers, who stood to gain the most from tax incentives.
Unlike the mandatory Social Security system, private pension
plans are voluntary and largely tax-driven. The employer receives an
immediate deduction for pension contributions, but the employee is
not taxed until amounts are distributed from the plan, and the plan
itself is tax-exempt so that earnings on plan assets accumulate tax-free.
Qualified plans rank among the largest tax expenditures in the fed-
eral budget and have prompted persistent concerns about the effi-
ciency and fairness of using tax incentives to encourage retirement
saving. 2 To qualify for favorable tax treatment, employer-based plans
have long been required to provide coverage to a broad cross-section
of workers, not merely to those at the top of the salary scale. Because
high-income workers generally have the greatest ability and inclina-
tion to save for retirement, the tax treatment of qualified plans juxta-
poses a "carrot" in the form of a tax subsidy with a "stick" in the form
of government regulation.3 According to the "liberal" view tradition-
ally associated with redistributive communitarian goals and tax expen-
diture analysis, preferential tax treatment is justified only to the extent
2 See STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX Ex-
PENDITURES FOR FisCAL YEARS 2006-2010 40 (Comm. Print 2006) (showing tax expenditure
of over $100 billion for employer-based plans in fiscal year 2006). More than half of the
tax benefit of elective contributions to defined contribution plans flows to the top 10% of
wage-earning households, while less than 10% flows to the bottom 50%. See David
Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred Saving Programs? Evi-
dence from Federal Income Tax Data, 54 NAT'L TAxJ. 669, 683 & fig.5 (2001); see also Leonard
E. Burman et al., Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution Plans and Individual Retirement
Arrangements, 57 NAT'L TAxJ. 671, 678 & tbl.1 (2004) (reporting similar findings).
3 See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is
It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue, 49 TAx L. REv.
1, 6-7 (1993) (describing pension policy in terms of the carrot-and-stick metaphor).
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that it induces employers to establish and maintain broad-based plans
which provide significant pension benefits for rank-and-file workers. 4
In contrast, a "libertarian" view, emphasizing freedom of choice
and individual opportunity, challenges the premise of tax expenditure
analysis and questions the utility of government regulation.5 Accord-
ing to this view, the appropriate baseline for evaluating the tax treat-
ment of private pensions is not an income tax, which implicitly favors
consumption over saving, but rather a consumption tax, which would
remove from the tax base all returns to saving. From a consumption
tax perspective, the current treatment of pension plans is normatively
correct and does not amount to a tax expenditure at all. Libertarians
view current restrictions on private plans as costly, burdensome, and
counterproductive, and they welcome 401 (k) plans and individual re-
tirement accounts (IRAs) as harbingers of a larger movement toward
a consumption tax. 6
When the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
was enacted in 1974, its regulatory provisions focused primarily on de-
fined benefit plans, which at that time predominated over defined
contribution plans. The situation has changed dramatically in the in-
tervening years, as defined contribution plans have grown steadily and
defined benefit plans have dwindled in relative importance. 7 In a
traditional defined benefit plan, the employer promises to pay speci-
fied pension benefits to each covered employee upon retirement; the
pension formula is typically based on the employee's years of service
and final or average compensation. The employer sponsors the plan,
funds it with contributions, directs the investment of plan assets, and
bears the financial risk if those assets prove insufficient to pay prom-
ised benefits. Benefits are generally payable to the employee upon
4 See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Munnell, Ensuring Retirement Income for All
Workers, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM 155 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005); Norman
P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage: Problems with the Private Pension
System and How They Should Inform the Social Security Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369
(2001).
5 See, e.g., Theodore R. Groom & John B. Shoven, Deregulating the Private Pension Sys-
tem, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 123; SylvesterJ. Schieber, The Evolu-
tion and Implications of Federal Pension Regulation, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM, supra
note 4, at 11.
6 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451,
454 (2004) (describing the emergence of the "defined contribution society" as "a quiet,
largely unheralded revolution" with fundamental consequences for tax and social policy).
7 By 2000, the value of assets held in defined contribution plans exceeded the value
of assets held in defined benefit plans. See STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PLANS AND OTHER RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 34 (Comm. Print 2002). Between 1992 and
2001, the share of households with pension coverage relying solely on defined contribu-
tion plans rose from 37% to 58%, while those relying solely on defined benefit plans fell
from 40% to 19%, and 23% maintained dual coverage. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA
SUNDtN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 21 (2004).
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retirement in the form of a single-life annuity (or a joint-and-survivor
annuity, in the case of a married employee); before retirement, the
employee typically has no access to pension funds. In contrast, 401 (k)
plans, which have become the dominant form of defined contribution
plans, generally give employees control over crucial decisions con-
cerning participation, contributions, investments, and distributions.
The shift away from defined benefit plans has major implications for
the allocation of risks and opportunities in the private pension system.
A. Tax Incentives for Coverage
The evolution of private plans since ERISA's enactment reflects a
contest between the liberal objective of broadening pension coverage
through targeted tax subsidies and the libertarian goal of reducing
the burdens of taxation and regulation. In 1981, Congress slashed the
top marginal tax rates but failed to restrain government spending,
which led to mounting budget deficits. During the next several years,
Congress scaled back the tax subsidy for private plans through new
limits on contributions and slower funding rules, in an attempt to as-
sert some degree of fiscal discipline without jeopardizing the tax-cut-
ting agenda.8 At the same time, Congress also imposed new
regulatory measures to ensure broader distribution of pension bene-
fits and deter excessive accumulations. The strategy of reducing tax
benefits and increasing regulatory requirements reached a high-water
mark in 1986, but its political and practical limitations became in-
creasingly apparent during the following decade. By the late 1990s, as
the budget situation gradually improved, the pendulum began to
swing back in the direction of relaxing regulatory restrictions and ex-
panding opportunities for tax-preferred individual saving.
In 1986, as part of a comprehensive revision of the tax code, Con-
gress imposed new limits on contributions and benefits for highly
compensated employees as well as stricter coverage and nondiscrimi-
nation requirements. These changes were intended both to en-
courage broader pension coverage and benefits for low- and
moderate-income workers and to limit revenue losses from the tax ex-
penditure for qualified plans.9 The efficacy of the tax subsidy, how-
ever, was undermined by declining marginal tax rates, and the
attraction of qualified plans was reduced by restrictions on contribu-
tions and benefits for highly compensated employees. Given the vol-
untary nature of qualified plans, it is hardly surprising that employers
responded to the 1986 legislation not by expanding pension coverage
8 See Schieber, supra note 5, at 30-32 (noting efforts in 1982 and 1984 to contain tax
expenditure for pensions).
9 See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 851, 887-88 (1987).
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or broadening benefits among the rank and file but rather by search-
ing for more valuable alternative forms of compensation.
As the attractiveness of qualified plans has diminished, many em-
ployers have resorted to nonqualified deferred compensation arrange-
ments to remunerate highly paid employees. In general, a
nonqualified plan consists of the employer's unfunded, unsecured
promise to pay pension benefits to the employee in the future. Both
the employer's deduction and the employee's inclusion are deferred
until the benefits are actually paid. Even if the employee and em-
ployer could earn the same pre-tax rate of return on an equivalent
investment, deferral is advantageous to the employee whenever the
employer's marginal tax rate is lower than the employee's. The prin-
cipal attraction of nonqualified plans is that they are exempt from the
regulatory requirements associated with qualified plans. As a result,
private pension plans have evolved toward a two-tier system, with qual-
ified plans for the rank and file and nonqualified plans for highly
compensated employees.' 0
From a liberal perspective, the private pension system may be fail-
ing to accomplish its goals. While the nondiscrimination rules may
have helped to limit tax expenditures for highly paid employees, they
have done little to improve qualified plan coverage for the rank and
file."I Indeed, private pensions provide a negligible amount of retire-
ment income for employees in the bottom 40% of the income scale. 12
Moreover, the growth of 401 (k) plans is unlikely to result in expanded
coverage. Given a choice between immediate cash compensation and
tax-preferred retirement saving, most low-income employees prefer
cash, despite the tax benefits of qualified plans. Even as private pen-
10 See Groom & Shoven, supra note 5, at 134; Halperin, supra note 3, at 33-35, 50.
11 Less than half of workers in the private sector currently participate in pension
plans. See MUNNELL & SUNDfN, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that pension coverage has re-
mained "virtually stagnant" since the late 1970s); see also Robert L. Clark et al., Effects of
Nondiscrimination Rules on Pension Participation, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES
259, 278-79 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2004) (finding that nondiscrimination rules have
not increased coverage of low-wage workers in absolute or relative terms); Peter R. Orszag,
Comment, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES, supra, at 280, 285-86 (suggesting that
even if nondiscrimination rules do not improve coverage, they may help to spread the tax
expenditure more equally).
12 In 1998, pensions provided only 3% of income for retired workers over age sixty-
five in the bottom quintile and 7% for those in the second-lowest quintile. See Halperin &
Munnell, supra note 4, at 156. The distribution of retirement savings in defined contribu-
tion plans and IRAs is similarly skewed; in 2001, the median account balance for families in
the lowest two quintiles was zero. See NAT'L AcAD. OF SOC. INS., UNCHARTED WATERS: PAYING
BENEFITS FROM INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS IN FEDERAL RETIREMENT POLICY 31-32 (Virginia P.




sion coverage falters, the tax expenditure for retirement saving has
exceeded the net increase in total personal saving in recent years.
13
Libertarians assess the impact of the nondiscrimination rules
quite differently. They view the nondiscrimination rules chiefly as a
barrier to saving by high-income earners rather than as an induce-
ment to saving by low-income earners. Since individuals differ widely
in their taste for saving, the nondiscrimination rules represent an im-
plicit tax to the extent that they require plans to cover employees who
place a low value on pension coverage. As a result, some of the bur-
den of subsidizing pension coverage for reluctant savers falls on em-
ployers and on employees who place a high value on retirement
saving. In contrast, 401 (k) plans permit employees to sort themselves
according to their tastes for saving, resulting in more efficient chan-
neling of the tax subsidy. 14 For libertarians, the goal is not to curb
excessive saving by highly paid employees, but rather to remove ex-
isting impediments to saving and to expand opportunities for individ-
uals to save as they see fit for retirement and other purposes. 15
B. Decline of Defined Benefit Plans
Over the past thirty years, the decline of defined benefit plans has
indisputably coincided with the rise of defined contribution plans, but
the reasons for the shift remain controversial. The decline of tradi-
tional defined benefit plans can be traced in part to structural
changes in labor markets and economic trends: intense competition
from low-wage labor overseas, prompting employers to downsize
workforces and demand significant concessions from the remaining
employees; a decline in average job tenure; a dramatic erosion of la-
bor union membership and bargaining power; the emergence of
health care as the most important employer-provided fringe benefit
for rank-and-file employees, displacing retirement benefits; and a
widening gap in compensation between highly compensated and
rank-and-file employees.' 6 In light of these trends, the assumption
underpinning traditional defined benefit plans-a stable workforce
with secure job tenure-has become largely obsolete.
Some observers believe that defined contribution plans have
crowded out defined benefit plans that otherwise would have flour-
13 See Elizabeth Bell et al., Retirement Saving Incentives and Personal Saving, 105 TAx
NOTES 1689, 1689 (2004).
14 See Richard A. Ippolito, Disparate Savings Propensities and National Retirement Policy, in
LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS 247, 252-53 (Olivia S. Mitchell & SylvesterJ.
Schieber eds., 1998) (suggesting that "a 401 (k) plan with matching encourages workers to
align their pay and productivity without imposing monitoring costs on the firm").
15 See Groom & Shoven, supra note 5, at 140-41.
16 See William G. Gale et al., The Shifting Structure of Private Pensions, in THE EVOLVING
PENSION SYsTEoM, supra note 4, at 51, 62-65; Schieber, supra note 5, at 44-45.
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ished. However, an alternative view suggests that defined benefit
plans would have withered in any case, due in large part to the in-
creasingly heavy burden of government regulation.1 7 ERISA's regula-
tory scheme bears more heavily on defined benefit plans and thus
puts them at a comparative disadvantage relative to defined contribu-
tion plans. For example, ERISA requires that defined benefit plans
pay annual premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), which monitors plan solvency and guarantees payment of a
portion of promised benefits. ERISA also imposes minimum and
maximum funding rules. For an employer, accelerated funding of a
defined benefit plan offers a significant tax advantage because the
plan's investment earnings accumulate tax-free, whereas the same re-
turn on assets held outside the plan would be taxable.
To prevent employers from using excess funds in qualified plans
as a source of corporate financing, in 1986 Congress imposed a 10%
excise tax (later increased to 50%) on asset reversions to employers
from overfunded plans. One year later, Congress tightened the "full
funding" provisions, which limit employers' ability to advance fund
pension obligations on a tax-preferred basis. These restrictions
sought to balance the goal of adequate funding of defined benefit
plans against the need to limit the cost of the tax subsidy. During the
stock market boom of the 1990s, rapidly increasing asset values al-
lowed many employers to suspend contributions to defined benefit
plans. The contribution holiday ended abruptly in 2000 and 2001,
when falling stock prices and low interest rates produced a spike in
required employer contributions. Critics argued that the funding lim-
its would force employers who had been prohibited from advance-
funding their plans during the boom years either to make massive
catch-up contributions or to cut back promised future benefits.18
Employers' attempts to slow the growth of funding obligations
may help to explain the recent trend toward abandoning traditional
defined benefit plans in favor of "cash balance" plans-hybrids which
combine defined benefit and defined contribution features.' 9 A cash
balance plan is formally classified as a defined benefit plan and is
managed by the employer, who contributes funds to the common
pool, controls investment decisions, bears financial risk, and pays in-
surance premiums to the PBGC. However, the defined benefit for
each employee is equal to the balance in a notional individual ac-
count based on deemed contributions and deemed interest at a pre-
17 See MUNNELL & SUND9N, supra note 7, at 22; Schieber, supra note 5, at 43-46.
18 See Schieber, supra note 5, at 46-47.
19 By 2000, cash balance plans accounted for nearly one-fourth of all workers covered
by defined benefit plans. See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 57. Conversion to a cash balance
plan is also the only viable method of terminating an overfunded traditional defined bene-
fit plan without incurring an excise tax on the plan reversion.
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scribed rate. Thus, from the employee's perspective, a cash balance
plan resembles a defined contribution plan: The employee receives
periodic statements showing an account balance that the employee
may withdraw in a lump sum upon termination of employment.
Conversions of traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance
plans are controversial because they tend to favor younger workers at
the expense of older workers, and it remains to be seen whether such
conversions will withstand age discrimination challenges.20 Pension
conversions and "freezes" also raise concerns about the adequacy of
total expected retirement benefits for the workers involved. Ironi-
cally, changes in the structure and funding of defined benefit plans
may weaken retirement security for mid-career workers precisely when
they must confront the prospect of Social Security reform.
C. Retirement Saving and Personal Wealth
According to the liberal view of tax-preferred retirement saving,
pensions are intended to provide employees with income that, in con-
junction with Social Security, will enable them to maintain an ade-
quate standard of living during retirement. Under this view, it is
appropriate to tailor the tax subsidy to encourage employees to pre-
serve pension funds for consumption during retirement and to limit
the amount and duration of tax-favored saving. For example, quali-
fied plans have long been subject to minimum distribution rules,
which require that participants begin receiving annual distributions
based on their actuarial life expectancy once they reach a specified
age. Additionally, in 1986 Congress enacted excise taxes on early
withdrawals from qualified plans and on excess distributions and accu-
mulations. These tax provisions limited the cost of the tax subsidy for
qualified plans and reinforced the goal of retirement income security
by discouraging the diversion of pension funds for other purposes.
As the budget outlook improved during the 1990s, however, the
libertarian view, with its emphasis on the goal of removing tax bur-
dens and regulatory restrictions on individual saving and wealth ac-
cumulation, began to gain ground. Libertarians saw no reason to
restrict favorable tax treatment to qualified plans or to require that
pension funds be consumed during retirement, and critics assailed
the excise taxes on excess distributions and accumulations as "success
20 One court has rejected such an age discrimination challenge. See Cooper v. IBM
Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006). Due to the back-loaded accrual of bene-
fits under a traditional defined benefit plan, mid-career employees typically stand to lose
more than younger workers when a plan is converted. Conversions may in turn under-
mine the value of pension promises and indirectly increase the cost to employers of main-
taining traditional defined benefit plans. See Halperin & Munnell, supra note 4, at 172;
Richard A. Ippolito, Comment, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES, supra note 11, at
43, 54 (warning of a potential "lemons market" in pensions).
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taxes."2' Barely a decade after enacting these excise taxes, Congress
reversed course and repealed them. 22 Most significantly, in 2001 Con-
gress substantially increased pension benefits available to high-income
earners by raising contribution and benefit limits. Liberal opponents
pointed out that increasing the contribution limits for 401(k) plans
would benefit only a small group-less than 10%-of participating
employees, mostly highly paid, who already contributed the maximum
allowable amount.23 These opponents also disputed the claim that
increasing the tax advantage of retirement saving for highly paid em-
ployees would encourage employers to establish more plans and ulti-
mately produce "trickle-down" benefits for rank-and-file employees. 2 4
The 2001 changes marked a decisive retreat from the earlier strategy
of targeted tax subsidies and regulation of qualified plans and re-
flected an emerging view of retirement savings as accumulations of
bequeathable wealth.
II
ASSESSING THE 401 (k) MODEL
Defined contribution plans, particularly those of the 401 (k) type,
have decisively overtaken traditional defined benefit plans as the pre-
dominant form of private pension plan. The distinctive characteristic
of 401 (k) plans is that they give individual employees unprecedented
control over decisions concerning contributions, investments, and
withdrawals of funds in their own accounts. Thus, 401 (k) plans re-
present a major shift of risk and responsibility from employers to em-
ployees. Although the nature of this shift is clear, its implications for
retirement policy remain controversial. Liberals worry that employ-
ees, especially those at the lower end of the wage scale, are likely to
make poor decisions and be left with inadequate retirement income.
In contrast, libertarians believe that employees are in the best position
to make choices concerning saving and investing for their own retire-
ment. Moreover, libertarians welcome 401 (k) plans as an evolution-
ary step on the road to unlimited tax-favored saving.
21 Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical Role
in Controlling the Hoodgates of Qualified Plan Wealth, 2000 BYU L. REv. 587, 595.
22 See id. In the late 1990s, Congress also relaxed the full funding limit for defined
benefit plans and eased restrictions on early withdrawals in cases of "hardship" and other
specified circumstances.
23 See MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 7, at 61-62; Halperin & Munnell, supra note 4,
at 187.
24 See Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income-The Ideal, the Possible, and the
Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 68 (2003).
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A. The Rise of 401 (k)s
The growing popularity of 401(k) plans began in 1981, when the
Treasury Department issued regulations approving "cash or deferred
arrangements" in which employees elect to defer tax on a portion of
their salary by directing the employer to contribute funds directly to a
qualified defined contribution plan. The 401 (k) model is attractive
for both employers and employees. For employers, 401 (k)s are less
burdensome than defined benefit plans, both financially and adminis-
tratively. In a 401 (k), retirement benefits are based on the balance in
each employee's individual account, which in turn depends on the
employee's net contributions and investment performance; the em-
ployer is not responsible for providing any specified level of pension
benefits.
For employees, the attraction of 401 (k)s is that participation is
voluntary: Each employee can choose either to contribute to his or
her account (subject to deferred tax on withdrawal) or to receive com-
pensation in cash (subject to immediate tax). Moreover, the entire
account balance is fully vested and freely portable; changing jobs has
no impact on account balances or future benefits. In addition,
401 (k)s foster a sense of ownership which many employees find reas-
suring-employees receive periodic statements showing their account
balances; plans typically allow employees to withdraw the entire bal-
ance in a lump sum upon retirement or termination of employment;
and any balance remaining in an employee's account at death passes
to his or her designated beneficiaries. 25
In effect, 401 (k)s function very much like IRAs, except that they
are part of an employer-sponsored plan. Indeed, employers may have
an important role to play in encouraging employees to participate in
401 (k)s by setting up automatic payroll deductions to facilitate volun-
tary employee contributions and by providing an employer match for
all or part of the employees' contributions. In addition, employers
remain responsible as fiduciaries for maintaining the plans that they
sponsor.
In recent years, many employers have taken steps to shift invest-
ment risks and responsibilities to employees, notably by ceding con-
trol to employees over the investment of funds in their individual
accounts. Under a statutory safe harbor for self-directed accounts,
employers are relieved of fiduciary liability for losses and breaches re-
sulting from the exercise of control by employees. Nevertheless, em-
ployers retain residuary responsibility for maintaining a "broad range"
of available investment options and ensuring that employees have ac-
25 Given a choice between a lump-sum distribution and an annuity, most people
choose the lump-sum option. See MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 7, at 157-58.
[Vol. 92:297
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
cess to sufficient information to allow them to make informed deci-
sions.2 6 Relieving employers of fiduciary responsibility for self-
directed accounts, however, has the perverse effect of discouraging
employers from providing specific investment advice that many em-
ployees desire. Indeed, self-directed plans offer an ever-expanding ar-
ray of options, far beyond the minimum range required by the safe
harbor.
The shift of risks and responsibilities to employees alarms some
liberals, who see this trend as a sign of ERISA's failure to respond to
changes in the pension world. 27 When ERISA was originally enacted,
defined contribution plans were viewed mainly as supplements to a
basic tier of retirement benefits provided by traditional defined bene-
fit plans and Social Security. As defined benefit plans have given way
to 401 (k)s as the primary plan for many workers, the premise of ER-
ISA's lenient regulatory framework for self-directed plans appears in-
creasingly at odds with the goal of ensuring that employees will end
up with adequate income during retirement. Employers, however,
would undoubtedly resist any attempt to impose greater fiduciary re-
sponsibility for guiding or monitoring investment decisions, just as
many employees would object to new constraints on their ability to
control the investments in their individual accounts. Accordingly, va-
rious reform proposals focus primarily on improving default rules to
provide guidance for employees without impinging on their freedom
of choice. It remains to be seen whether such "soft" paternalism will
lead to greater retirement security across the board for 401 (k)
participants.
B. Assessing 401 (k)s
While libertarians emphasize the success of 401 (k) plans in open-
ing opportunities for individual employees to make their own deci-
sions about saving and investment,28 liberals see a much bleaker
picture. Focusing on outcomes rather than opportunities, liberals
point out that the rewards of 401 (k)s are heavily skewed toward highly
paid employees, who would accumulate savings even without a tax
subsidy. Meanwhile, many rank-and-file employees fail to save ade-
quately for retirement, even with the incentives of tax-favored treat-
26 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2006) (implementing ERISA § 404(c)'s safe harbor
provision).
27 See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to Leave
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. PoL'v 361, 363, 369-73
(2002).
28 See Groom & Shoven, supra note 5, at 141 (advocating "maximum flexibility as to
the type, form, and contents" of retirement saving and stressing the values of "[c]reativity
of markets, self-reliance and individual responsibility"); id. at 151 (describing employer-
sponsored pensions as "one of the big successes").
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ment and employer matching contributions-for them, 401(k)s are
"coming up short."29 In making decisions about participation, invest-
ment, and use of assets, employees "make mistakes at every step along
the way."'30 Given the option to participate in a 401 (k) plan, more
than a quarter of all eligible employees do not do so at all, and less
than 10% of participants contribute the maximum allowable amount.
Moreover, whether through inexperience, bad advice, or poor judg-
ment, 401 (k) participants often make objectively bad investment deci-
sions: most participants fail to diversify or rebalance their portfolios,
more than half either hold no stocks at all or invest virtually their
entire accounts in stocks, and many invest a substantial portion of
their accounts in employer stock when they are allowed to do so. 3 1
Finally, in deciding when and how to withdraw funds from their ac-
counts, most participants take a lump sum distribution upon termina-
tion or retirement. Although large lump sums received at retirement
are likely to be rolled over into IRAs, smaller amounts are likely to be
spent rather than saved for retirement.
In making decisions about retirement and saving, employees fre-
quently lack clearly defined, consistent preferences. 32 Many employ-
ees are prone to inertia and procrastination; to avoid the laborious
process of comparing alternative options and making affirmative
choices, they simply follow default rules. Moreover, when faced with
the need to choose-for example, in allocating funds among several
investment options-they often take the path of least resistance or re-
sort to a simplistic shortcut by spreading funds equally across all avail-
able options. 33 Once employees make their initial choices, they are
unlikely to reexamine or modify those choices.
Accordingly, it may be possible to influence decisions and achieve
better outcomes simply by changing the default settings in 401(k)s
and similar plans.34 For example, instead of requiring employees to
29 See MUNNELL & SUND9N, supra note 7, at 172.
30 Id. at 13; see id. at 80-92 (discussing investment decisions); id. at 150-59, 170-71
(discussing preference for lump sum distributions).
31 Employees may view an employer's offer of matching contributions in company
stock as an implicit endorsement of company stock as an investment. See Richard L.
Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 53, 71-72
(2004).
32 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2003) ("[I]n many domains, people lack clear, stable, or
well-ordered preferences."); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evi-
dence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275 (1991).
33 If the options are too numerous, the result may be confusion and paralysis. See
MUNNELL & SUNDPN, supra note 7, at 71-73 (noting that a vast array of choices may be
"demotivating" rather than welfare enhancing).
34 See WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., RET. SEC. PROJECT, THE AUTOMATIC 401(K): A SIMPLE
WAY TO STRENGTHEN RETIREMENT SAVINGS 1 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.
edu/views/papers/20050228_401k.pdf; Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of
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make an affirmative election to participate, the plan could provide for
automatic enrollment while maintaining freedom of choice by permit-
ting employees to opt out.35 Similarly, the plan could specify pre-
sumptive levels for contributions, with automatic increases geared to
future salary raises to avoid the need for periodic review. Plans could
encourage better investment practices by setting default allocations
geared to the participant's age and income level. Default options
could also be structured to encourage employees to preserve account
balances until retirement (e.g., through an automatic rollover on ter-
mination before retirement), and to take distributions upon retire-
ment in the form of a single-life annuity (or a joint-and-survivor
annuity, in the case of a married employee).
Although changing the default rules might seem to be an easy
and obvious way to address the shortcomings of 401(k) plans, this ap-
proach is likely to encounter resistance from employers because it im-
plies a more active role on the part of plan sponsors. A significant
obstacle to any provision for automatic enrollment stems from the de-
sign-based safe harbor for 401 (k)s, which allows an employer to satisfy
the nondiscrimination rules by offering to match a portion of em-
ployee contributions, even if no employee actually accepts the offer.
Since any increase in employee contributions drives up the cost of the
employer match, employers have little incentive to encourage broad-
based employee participation or investor education, and they would
undoubtedly oppose any attempt to limit the design-based safe harbor
(e.g., by making it available only for plans that offer automatic enroll-
ment). Problems also arise in formulating prudent investment rules
for participants who fail to make affirmative choices. Under the safe
harbor for self-directed accounts, employers are not liable for losses
resulting from employee investment decisions, and they are unlikely
to embrace an expanded role of providing investment advice with its
additional fiduciary responsibilities. 3 6
The principal goal of changing the default rules would be to help
individual employees to make better decisions concerning participa-
tion and investment throughout their working lives. For liberals, this
mildly paternalistic approach promises to improve participation rates
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001);
Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More TomorrowTM : Using Behavioral Economics to
Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004).
35 This approach is now authorized by statute. See Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1033-34.
36 Employers that sponsor 401 (k) plans with automatic enrollment often establish
low-risk, low-return money market funds as the default investment option. To encourage
them to adopt a default setting with higher risks and returns, it might be necessary to
provide additional protection from potential fiduciary liability. See MUNNELL & SUNDtN,
supra note 7, at 175.
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and investment outcomes among rank-and-file employees who are not
well served by the existing system. Even libertarians, who generally
oppose regulatory constraints on individual choice, should be willing
to accept welfare-enhancing changes in the default rules as long as
individual employees can freely opt out.3 7 Given the limited efficacy
of previous efforts to turn rank-and-file employees-who stand most
in need of assistance-into sophisticated investors, the only practica-
ble alternative may be to streamline the decisions they are expected to
make in saving for retirement.
C. Tax Reform Proposals
As part of its tax-cutting agenda, the Bush Administration has ad-
vanced proposals to reduce tax rates on capital income and expand
opportunities for tax-sheltered individual savings accounts.3 8 These
proposals would move the existing hybrid system in the direction of a
consumption tax, and they raise questions about the continued viabil-
ity of 401 (k)s in a consumption-tax world. Under a pure consumption
tax, all savings would be exempt from tax, and retirement savings
would thus lose their relative tax advantage. As a result, the regulatory
restrictions, which are linked to the tax subsidy for qualified plans
under current law, would become increasingly difficult to maintain.
Since most individuals save very little on their own initiative, a decline
in employer-based plans might well leave increasing numbers of em-
ployees without adequate retirement savings.3 9
Expanding access to tax-sheltered individual savings accounts
would blur the distinction between special-purpose retirement saving
and all-purpose general saving. To the extent that the new accounts
allow free access to tax-preferred savings, they would create pressure
to allow employees to withdraw funds from their 401(k) balances
before retirement. For example, the proposed Lifetime Savings Ac-
count (LSA) would allow penalty-free withdrawals at any time and for
37 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 32, at 1161-62; id. at 1182 (noting the "inevitabil-
ity of paternalism").
38 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2006 REVENUE PROPOSALS 5-15 (2005), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk05.pdf (proposing expanded tax-sheltered savings ac-
counts); see also PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAx SYSTEM 114-21 (2005), available at http://www.
taxreformpanel.gov/final-report (proposing tax-sheltered savings accounts for retirement,
health, education, and other purposes); id. at 124-25 (proposing a "simplified income tax"
plan with 75% capital gains exclusion on stock sales and 100% dividend exclusion).
39 Lower tax rates might stimulate some additional all-purpose general saving, but it
seems implausible that such saving would be undertaken by individuals who fail to respond
to existing tax incentives or that it would be used for retirement purposes. See Karen C.
Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings Accounts, 25
VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1139-44 (2006).
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any purpose; it might better be described as a lifetime spending ac-
count.40 For most low- and moderate-income individuals, the LSA
would probably emerge as the primary savings vehicle. 4'
The Bush Administration's proposals highlight the tension be-
tween liberal and libertarian views concerning tax and retirement pol-
icies. From a liberal perspective, the proposed new savings accounts
would weaken the existing tax incentives for employer-based retire-
ment plans and might amount to little more than costly tax shelters
for highly compensated employees. The new accounts would appeal
primarily to high-income individuals who are constrained by the con-
tribution limits for 401 (k)s and IRAs under current law. Those indi-
viduals would likely not increase their net saving but rather simply
shift existing funds from taxable vehicles to the new tax-sheltered ac-
counts.42 The new accounts would also give rise to substantial long-
term revenue losses due to their back-loaded structure-unlike tradi-
tional IRAs, contributions would not be deductible, but the entire
yield would be tax-exempt. As with Roth IRAs, this structure appar-
ently reflects the exigencies of budget politics rather than any coher-
ent tax policy.43
From a libertarian perspective, proposals to expand tax-sheltered
individual savings accounts provide a welcome opportunity to reassess
the role of employers in facilitating retirement saving. If individual
accounts compete successfully with employer-based plans, they may
herald a decisive shift away from the traditional system of tax-subsi-
dized, heavily regulated employer-based plans toward a deregulated
system of individual accounts administered by private financial in-
termediaries. In the evolving system, employers would be relieved of
their remaining fiduciary responsibilities and their role would be lim-
ited to coordinating voluntary employee enrollment and participation
through payroll deductions.44 In short, existing 401 (k) plans and
IRAs might be viewed as evolutionary steps on a path toward a model
40 See id. at 1144.
41 The Bush Administration's budget proposals would replace traditional and Roth
IRAs with a Retirement Savings Account (RSA), and 401 (k)s and similar employer-spon-
sored plans would be consolidated into an Employer Retirement Savings Account. The
Administration originally proposed higher contribution limits for LSAs and RSAs, but low-
ered those limits in response to concerns expressed by pension lobbying groups about the
impact on employer-based plans. See id. at 1116-19, 1121-24.
42 See id. at 1139-40.
43 See id. at 1133-36.
44 Indeed, such a shift in the role of employers may already be occurring. See Pamela
Perun & C. Eugene Steuerle, From Fiduciary to Facilitator: Employers and Defined Contribution
Plans, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 191-92 (discussing the movement




of unlimited private savings with minimal restrictions on contribu-
tions, investments, and distributions.
SIII
INDVIDUAL AccouNTs AND SOCIAL SECURITY
Since its inception over sixty years ago, Social Security has re-
flected a tension between the liberal goal of ensuring minimally ade-
quate retirement income for all covered workers and the libertarian
goal of promoting individual choice and responsibility for retirement
saving. The existing system is essentially a mandatory, broad-based de-
fined benefit plan which is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis through a
flat payroll tax on covered wages. In addition to the implicit transfers
from younger workers to older retirees, the system also redistributes
benefits within generations due to its bottom-weighted benefit
formula and its subsidized benefits for spouses and dependent family
members. Given the imbalance between projected revenues and
promised benefits, some changes will clearly be necessary, but there is
no consensus on the scope of the problem or the direction of future
reform.
The Bush Administration has consistently pressed for individual
accounts as an essential component of Social Security reform. In
keeping with President Bush's insistence that "[m] odernization must
include individually controlled, voluntary personal retirement ac-
counts," the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security
outlined three alternative proposals featuring individual accounts as
part of its final report issued in December 2001.45 Although the pro-
posals vary in detail and are not fully specified, they signal a funda-
mental change in the structure of the existing Social Security system
by shifting significant risk from the public system to individual
participants. 46
A. The Structure of Individual Accounts
Under the Commission's proposals, each worker would have the
option to divert a portion of his or her payroll taxes from the tradi-
tional Social Security system to an individual account in the worker's
own name.47 Workers exercising the option would receive fully vested
ownership of the balance in their individual accounts, but they would
also pay a price in the form of reduced regular Social Security bene-
45 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN Soc. SEC., supra note 1, at 14-16.
46 The discussion here focuses primarily on the Commission's Reform Model 2. See
id. at 15, 119-30.
47 Under the Commission's proposals, a worker could divert a specified portion of
covered wages each year: 2% under Reform Model 1; 4% (up to $1,000) under Reform
Model 2; or 2.5% (up to $1,000) under Reform Model 3. See id. at 14-16.
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fits. The reduced benefit would be calculated by taking the amounts
contributed to a worker's individual account, compounding them to
the worker's retirement date at a specified interest rate (the "offset
rate"), and converting the result to a hypothetical single-life annuity,
which would then be offset dollar-for-dollar against the worker's regu-
lar Social Security benefit.48 The arrangement is functionally
equivalent to a margin transaction in which the worker borrows funds
to acquire the investments in the individual account and agrees to
repay the loan, with interest, solely from his or her regular Social Se-
curity benefit. Thus, the worker stands to gain if the investments in
the individual account outperform the offset rate, and stands to lose if
they do not.
The Commission contemplates a two-tiered system of individual
accounts, comprising a basic, low-cost tier with a limited choice of in-
dex funds and a supplemental tier with a broader range of investment
options and correspondingly higher administrative costs. 49 All contri-
butions would initially be invested in the basic tier, which would offer
nine investment options, including diversified stock and bond index
funds, balanced index funds, and federal government bond funds.
Once the balance in a worker's individual account reached a specified
threshold (e.g., $5,000), additional investment options in the supple-
mental tier would become available, including a range of diversified,
no-load mutual funds. A "standard" fund would be designated as the
default investment for workers who failed to make an affirmative allo-
cation. No withdrawals from individual accounts would be allowed
before retirement. Upon retirement, workers would be required to
annuitize a portion of their individual accounts before they could
withdraw the remaining balance. The annuity requirement, which
might be satisfied either by purchasing a commercial annuity or by
taking phased withdrawals over time, is intended to ensure that work-
ers and their spouses will have sufficient income from their individual
accounts, in combination with their regular Social Security benefits, to
keep them out of poverty during retirement. Any balance remaining
in an individual account at the owner's death would be fully
inheritable.
48 The Commission appears to contemplate an offset rate corresponding to a real rate
of return (i.e., the rate in excess of inflation) ranging from 2% to 3.5%. See id. at 99 (3.5%
under Reform Model 1; 2% under Reform Model 2; 2.5% under Reform Model 3). For
further discussion of the offset mechanism, see Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Assess-
ing the Plans Proposed by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 96 TAx NOTES
703 (2002); Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, Offsetting the Principal in the New
Social Security Accounts, 107 TAx NOTES 109 (2005).
49 The structure of the proposed individual account system is described in PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 1, at 41-62.
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The Commission's proposals are designed to give workers an op-
portunity to accumulate sufficient individual account balances to re-
place the regular Social Security benefits lost as a result of the offset.
The structure of the standard fund would be especially important,
since experience with 401 (k) plans indicates that many workers are
likely to have their individual account balances invested in that fund
by default. Moreover, some workers may view the standard fund as a
benchmark for their own investments, or as implicitly endorsed by the
government. Recognizing that the appropriate level of risk may de-
pend on a worker's age, the Commission appears to contemplate a
"life cycle" allocation weighted toward stocks for younger workers and
bonds for older workers.50 To the extent that the standard fund re-
flects a safe investment strategy, however, it may reinforce the risk-
averse preferences of many low-income workers and generate low re-
turns that cancel out much of the progressive tilt in the formula for
regular Social Security benefits. Indeed, without a government guar-
antee of a minimum rate of return, low-income workers may be suffi-
ciently concerned about the loss of regular Social Security benefits
that they will hesitate to opt for individual accounts in the first place.
Even small administrative costs could significantly erode the value
of individual accounts over time. In both tiers of the individual ac-
count system, mutual fund providers would be prohibited from charg-
ing front-end or back-end sales loads, and would further be required
to combine all administrative charges in a single annual fee expressed
as a percentage of asset values. The Commission relies primarily on
competition among mutual fund providers and standardized disclo-
sure of fees to contain administrative costs, without proposing any
caps on permissible fees. 51 Since mutual funds routinely charge re-
duced fees for large account balances, a disproportionate share of the
burden would likely fall on workers with small individual account bal-
ances, and the number of small accounts would be enormous. 52 Al-
though the Commission apparently intends to provide a measure of
50 See id. at 52. There is no assurance that a life-cycle approach would yield any speci-
fied rate of return. See Robert J. Shiller, The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social
Security: An Evaluation 8-10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11300,
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wll300 (projecting a substantial
probability of negative investment returns, net of the offset, for various hypothetical life-
cycle portfolios); see also id. at 6 (describing the life-cycle portfolio as the "centerpiece" of
the Bush Administration's plan).
51 The Commission assumes an annual administrative charge of 0.3% of the individ-
ual account balance which, when deducted from the assumed 4.9% real rate of return (in
excess of inflation) on a balanced portfolio, leaves a net annual real rate of return of 4.6%.
See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 1, at 97. These assumptions
may be unduly optimistic.
52 In 2001, half of all workers earned less than $21,600; their annual contributions to
individual accounts at a 2% rate would amount to no more than $432 per account. See
NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., supra note 12, at 37.
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protection for low-income workers while allowing greater freedom of
choice for moderate- and high-income workers, the two-tiered ap-
proach seems inherently fragile. Workers with a taste for riskier in-
vestments and mutual fund providers would undoubtedly press for
more flexibility and less regulation in the supplemental tier, and it
would become politically awkward to accede to their demands while
denying similar treatment for workers with accounts invested in the
basic tier.53 Consequently, the basic tier might ultimately serve as lit-
tle more than a default setting for workers who failed to choose a
different investment option. There would be no assurance, however,
that workers who opted out of the basic tier would be better off as a
result.
Restrictions on access to individual accounts before and during
retirement are also likely to prove unpopular. Experience with 401 (k)
plans illustrates the political difficulty of maintaining a strict prohibi-
tion on early withdrawals, especially in cases of hardship. Likewise, a
requirement of partial annuitization during retirement will collide
with the marked preference of most employees for lump sum distribu-
tions. Requiring a threshold level of annuitization to keep retired
workers above the poverty level is fully consistent with the goal of so-
cial adequacy, but that goal could be realized much more readily by
adjusting the defined benefit formula in the traditional Social Security
system than by restricting access to individual accounts. In effect, a
partial annuitization requirement will produce a bifurcated system
that forces low-income workers to annuitize most or all of their indi-
vidual account balances, while allowing higher-income workers
greater choice in the timing of withdrawals. 54
Such differential treatment may be challenged as unfair. It also
runs counter to the Commission's claim that individual accounts
would enhance opportunities for low-income workers to accumulate
personal wealth. Indeed, the notion of individual accounts as a
source of bequeathable wealth is fundamentally inconsistent with a
social insurance model designed to provide retirement income as a
replacement for lost wages. Allowing workers to bequeath their re-
maining individual account balances at death represents a form of
leakage which drains resources from the defined benefit component
of Social Security and implicitly drives up the cost of regular retire-
ment benefits for the remaining workers.
53 The expanded role of financial intermediaries might elicit demands to protect par-
ticipants from fraud or overreaching, which would presumably require a new layer of gov-
ernment regulation. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social
Security: Administration and Implementation, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1325, 1336-39 (2001).
54 See NAT'L ACAD. OF Soc. INS., supra note 12, at 62; Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the
Four "Truths" of Personal Social Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(k) Plans, 81
N.C. L. REv. 901, 956-57 (2003).
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B. Impact on Social Security
Workers who establish individual accounts would incur new mar-
ket risks and lose a portion of their regular Social Security benefits. In
assessing the impact of the proposals on the Social Security system,
the central question is whether the advantages of individual accounts
outweigh the risks. It is thus important to note that individual ac-
counts by themselves will not restore Social Security to fiscal solvency.
Under the Commission's proposals, solvency can be achieved only
through a combination of reductions in promised benefits and infu-
sions of additional revenue from unspecified sources. Diverting pay-
roll taxes to fund individual accounts would reduce the revenue
available to pay promised benefits, and the loss would be offset only to
the extent that the interest rate charged on individual account contri-
butions matched the rate of return on Treasury obligations held in
the Social Security trust fund. In theory, assuming an actuarially neu-
tral offset rate, the reduction in regular Social Security benefits would
compensate for the reduced revenue, resulting in a wash.
Although individual accounts would not directly improve Social
Security's fiscal outlook, they are sometimes portrayed as a necessary
"sweetener" to facilitate other changes-in particular, scaled-back reg-
ular benefits for moderate- and high-income workers. 55 According to
this argument, such workers will accept reductions in their regular
Social Security benefits more readily if they have the opportunity to
earn a return on their individual accounts in excess of the offset rate
on funds diverted from the rest of the system. For individuals who
already hold diversified portfolios of stocks and bonds, however, an
unsubsidized loan from the government, with interest equal to the
rate of return on Treasury obligations, holds no special appeal. If
such individuals wish to increase their exposure to stock market re-
turns, they can already do so by exchanging bonds for stocks; the
higher yield on stocks merely compensates for the increased market
risk of the portfolio. Low-income individuals who lack adequate expo-
sure to stocks might benefit from greater diversification, but as illus-
trated by experience with 401 (k) plans, such individuals are likely to
be strongly risk-averse and to encounter difficulties in making appro-
priate investment choices. 56
55 See An Oversight Hearing on President Bush's Social Security Privatization Plan: Will You
and Your Family Be Worse Off? Hearing Before S. Democratic Policy Comm., 109th Cong. 16-17
(2005) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies and Director of
Retirement Security Project, Brookings Institution), available at http://democrats.senate.
gov/dpc/hearings/hearing2l /orszag.pdf.
56 See Daniel Halperin, The Case Against Privatization, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 75, 78 (2004)
(describing the Commission's proposals for individual accounts as "unnecessary for the
well-off and unwise for the rest of the population").
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To induce workers to contribute to individual accounts, it may be
necessary to provide a subsidy by reducing the offset rate below an
actuarially neutral level. Such a subsidy might be attractive, especially
to high earners, but it would drive up the cost of individual accounts
and exacerbate the long-term fiscal imbalance of the rest of the Social
Security system. 57 In the absence of additional revenue from in-
creased payroll taxes or general revenues, 58 a subsidy for individual
accounts would require further reductions in regular Social Security
benefits for workers in the rest of the system. Thus, if individual ac-
counts are subsidized to the extent necessary to make them attractive,
they threaten to undermine the defined benefit component of the
Social Security system.
The most significant cost savings come from proposals to scale
back regular Social Security benefits for moderate- and high-income
workers through progressive price indexing. These proposals would
leave the traditional wage-indexed benefit formula unchanged for the
30% of covered workers who earn less than $20,000. For workers fur-
ther up the salary scale, however, wage indexing would be phased out
and replaced with price indexing. Thus, workers with maximum cov-
ered wages would receive benefits based solely on price indexing.
Under price indexing, real benefit levels would rise with price in-
creases but would no longer keep pace with real wage growth. In ef-
fect, price indexing is equivalent to a substantial reduction in
promised benefits for future retirees. Low-income workers would be
exempted from price indexing in order to spare them from shoulder-
ing the burden of restoring solvency to the existing system. Over
time, however, the progressive price indexing proposals would ulti-
mately replace traditional earnings-based benefits with a flat benefit
for most workers. 59 Replacement rates for moderate- and high-in-
57 The Commission asserts that "[s]o long as the personal account earns a return
higher than the offset rate, both Social Security and the individual come out ahead." PRES-
IDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 1, at 74. This claim ignores the
possibility that the offset rate might be less than the interest rate on Treasury obligations
that the Social Security trust fund would have earned had funds not been diverted to indi-
vidual accounts. See Diamond & Orszag, supra note 48, at 714 (concluding that Reform
Models 2 and 3 are "designed to subsidize the individual accounts at the expense of the
Trust Fund").
58 Even if the Commission's proposals maintain revenue neutrality in the long term, a
substantial infusion of revenue would be needed to replace funds diverted to individual
accounts from the rest of the Social Security system. The Commission acknowledges that
additional revenue would be needed to finance the transition but conspicuously fails to
specify where the revenue would come from. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC.
SEC., supra note 1, at 72 (labeling the temporary increase in needed resources as "invest-
ments" rather than "costs").
59 Over time, price-indexed benefits for moderate- and high-income workers would
gradually converge with wage-indexed benefits for workers in the thirtieth percentile of the
wage distribution. See Memorandum from Patrick Purcell, Specialist in Soc. Legislation,
Domestic Soc. Policy Div., to Senate Fin. Comm. 6-9 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at http://
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come workers would fall, and workers at the top of the wage scale
would receive the same dollar amount of benefits as workers earning
much less. Ironically, the implicit benefit cuts from full price index-
ing would be more than sufficient to restore Social Security to sol-
vency, without injecting individual accounts into the system. 60
Indeed, solvency could have been achieved with less drastic benefit
cuts had the Commission not been barred from considering any in-
crease in the payroll tax.61
By cutting regular Social Security benefits to make room for indi-
vidual accounts while purportedly preserving benefits for low-income
workers, the Commission's proposals accentuate the redistributive fea-
tures of the benefit formula. To the extent that low-income workers
receive a disproportionately high ratio of benefits to wages, the de-
fined benefit component of the proposed system is likely to be identi-
fied as a welfare program. Moreover, under the Commission's
proposals, moderate- and high-income workers would have a dimin-
ishing stake in that part of the system, even as it becomes more impor-
tant for low-income workers. 62 As a result, the defined benefit
component might lose political support and become vulnerable to ad-
ditional cuts in the future. Indeed, if asset values in individual ac-
counts were to drop sharply during an economic downturn, political
pressure to grant relief to individual account holders by reducing the
offset rate might well prove irresistible, even though such relief would
leave the rest of the system in an even more precarious condition.
Thus, from a liberal perspective, any proposal to carve out individual
accounts with diverted payroll taxes threatens to jeopardize the fiscal
and political viability of the defined benefit component of the system.
In contrast, from a libertarian perspective, the Commission's pro-
posals do not go far enough. In a fully privatized system, benefits
would depend entirely on the accumulated value of the holder's indi-
vidual account, and there would be no redistribution within or across
generations. The hybrid system proposed by the Commission, com-
www.tcf.org/Publications/RetirementSecurity/CRS-PriceIndexing-04-22-05.pdf
("[S] omewhat paradoxically, if real wages rise faster than projected, price indexing would
result in deeper benefit cuts, even as Social Security's unfunded 75-year liability would be
shrinking.").
60 See id. at 6 ("According to the [Social Security Administration], fully price-indexing
initial benefits would more than restore solvency to Social Security.").
61 See PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY 195 (2004) (not-
ing that "[t]he Bush administration has explicitly ruled out payroll tax increases as part of
Social Security's reform").
62 In 2004, Social Security benefits accounted for more than 90% of income for the
bottom quintile and less than 20% of income for the top quintile; pensions and annuities
accounted for less than 2% of income for the bottom quintile and more than 25% for the
top quintile. Ken McDonnell, Income of the Elderly Population, Age 65 and Over, 2004, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, Jan. 2006, at 9, 9.
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prising individual accounts as well as defined benefits, would perpetu-
ate the redistributive features of the traditional Social Security system,
including derivative benefits for spouses and dependent family mem-
bers.63 It seems unrealistic, however, to expect that the existing sys-
tem of elaborate cross-subsidies would survive intact in the new hybrid
system. Thus, libertarians may find a system with carved-out individ-
ual accounts acceptable on tactical grounds as an incremental step
away from social adequacy and toward individual equity. In sum, lib-
ertarians may view the Commission's proposals as an opportunity to
change the nature of the existing Social Security system and move to-
ward full privatization. 6
4
C. Alternative Approaches
The existing Social Security system provides a basic tier of infla-
tion-protected retirement income which lasts throughout each
worker's lifetime. The public system of defined benefits has become
increasingly important for many workers, especially as traditional de-
fined benefit plans have given way to 401 (k) plans in the private pen-
sion sector. Due to its mandatory, nearly universal coverage, Social
Security also facilitates the pooling of risks within and across genera-
tions in ways that would be difficult or impossible to achieve in a de-
fined contribution system. While individual accounts might make
sense as a supplement to Social Security's defined benefit system, di-
verting payroll taxes to fund voluntary carved-out individual accounts
is likely to impose new costs and burdens with potentially destabilizing
effects on the entire system. Although some workers might reap sub-
stantial rewards from individual accounts, others would certainly lose.
Unlike the defined benefit component, individual accounts would of-
fer no guarantee of even minimally adequate benefits, and workers
seeking higher returns from stock market investments would be ex-
posed to correspondingly higher risks and market fluctuations. Expe-
rience with 401 (k)s suggests that many workers, especially those with
low lifetime earnings, would make inappropriate choices and end up
with inadequate retirement savings.
Although individual accounts are often touted as vehicles for fos-
tering broad-based wealth accumulation and individual financial re-
sponsibility, such claims signal a radical rejection of fundamental
63 For example, in the case of a one-earner married couple, the offset based on the
worker's individual account contributions would apply to the couple's total benefits, result-
ing in a smaller percentage benefit reduction than for an unmarried worker. See NAT'L
ACAD. OF Soc. INS., supra note 12, at 175-76. The Commission also recommends increas-
ing benefits for "widows of below-average wage earners." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO
STRENGTHEN Soc. SEC., supra note 1, at 107.




principles of social insurance. Moreover, the argument that individ-
ual accounts are needed as a sweetener to compensate highly paid
workers for steep cuts in regular Social Security benefits appears to be
little more than a tautology intended to justify the Bush Administra-
tion's insistence that individual accounts form an integral part of any
reform proposal. Under the Commission's proposals, individual ac-
counts would be attractive only if they were subsidized by an artificially
low offset rate, which in turn would increase fiscal pressure on the rest
of the system and might eventually lead to even deeper cuts in the
defined benefit component.
Social Security has traditionally been the basic source of retire-
ment security for most workers, with employer-based plans and per-
sonal savings providing supplementary income. Since few individuals
currently contribute the maximum allowable amount to 401 (k) plans
and even fewer accumulate substantial personal savings, the reasons
for carving out voluntary individual accounts within Social Security re-
main unclear. If the goal is to encourage broad-based saving for re-
tirement, it might be worth considering alternative approaches. For
example, expanding tax-favored saving opportunities for low-income
earners through a federal matching program would ameliorate the
inadequacy of existing Social Security benefits for low-income earners
while channeling benefits to those most in need of increased retire-
ment savings.65 Such a matching program would be more likely to
increase overall savings than tax subsidies to high-income earners,
who may simply shift savings from taxable to tax-preferred vehicles.
Given the skewing of private pension benefits toward high-income
earners against a backdrop of rising inequality of income and wealth
and a regressive payroll tax structure, it may be appropriate for high-
income earners to bear a larger share of the burden for restoring So-
cial Security to solvency.
CONCLUSION
In the debate over Social Security reform, attention has focused
on recent proposals to restructure Social Security as a hybrid system
with voluntary individual accounts and a residual defined benefit com-
ponent. Carving out individual accounts from the existing system
would shift significant risks and responsibilities to individual workers.
A parallel development has already occurred in the area of private
pensions, where 401 (k) plans have overtaken defined benefit plans as
the dominant employer-based vehicle for retirement saving. Experi-
ence with 401 (k)s indicates that many workers will have difficulty mak-
65 See Halperin & Munnell, supra note 4, at 180-81; William G. Gale et al., The Saver's
Credit: Issues and Options, 103 TAx NOTEs 597, 603-04 (2004).
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ing prudent decisions concerning investment and withdrawal of funds
in their individual accounts. Moreover, in implementing any system
of voluntary individual accounts, it will be important to design default
settings that provide appropriate guidance for workers with heteroge-
neous levels of financial sophistication and risk tolerance. In contrast
to private pensions, Social Security provides mandatory, nearly univer-
sal coverage without relying on tax incentives to induce participation
by reluctant savers. Although a two-tiered structure of individual ac-
counts could provide basic safeguards by constraining investment and
withdrawal options for workers with small account balances, the pres-
sure to weaken those safeguards might prove irresistible over time.
It is not immediately clear why individual accounts occupy such a
central role in the Social Security debate. Individual accounts do not
ameliorate the long-term fiscal gap which is the catalyst for reform.
Moreover, voluntary individual accounts are already available through
401 (k) plans and IRAs, and those vehicles could readily be expanded
without restructuring Social Security. The most plausible explanation
appears to lie in the realm of values and politics rather than econom-
ics.66 By carving out individual accounts and funding them with pay-
roll taxes diverted from the existing defined benefit system, the
reform proposals would change the very nature of Social Security.
The existing system is based on the concept of social insurance, which
balances social adequacy and individual equity and commands broad
political support while providing a reliable source of retirement in-
come to workers at all income levels. In contrast, a bifurcated system
with individual accounts would isolate the defined benefit component
and accentuate its redistributive function. If, as seems likely, the indi-
vidual accounts were subsidized to the extent necessary to make them
attractive, they could easily exacerbate the fiscal gap and gradually un-
dermine political support for the defined benefit component. Not-
withstanding the ostensible goal of saving Social Security, the ultimate
outcome might be the dismantling of the existing social insurance
program.
From the perspective of national retirement policy, proposals for
Social Security reform cannot realistically be evaluated in isolation
from private pensions. Employer-based plans provide an important
source of retirement income for many workers, but they are generally
understood as ancillary to the basic coverage provided by Social Secur-
ity. Indeed, with the rise of 401 (k) plans, it has become increasingly
clear that tax-driven private pensions have a limited capacity to ex-
66 See Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DEBATE 38, 63 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998) ("[T]he heart of the reform
debate is based on different values and different prognoses of politics, not substantial eco-
nomic disagreements.").
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pand coverage or increase voluntary retirement saving among workers
who stand most in need. As a result, the central goal of Social Security
reform should be to close the fiscal gap in a way that preserves rather
than undermines the existing system of mandatory defined benefits
for all workers.
